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Abstract
The AGM theory of belief revision is based on
propositional belief sets. In this paper we develop a
logic for revision of temporal belief bases, contain-
ing expressions about temporal propositions (to-
morrow it will rain), possibility (it may rain tomor-
row), actions (the robot enters the room) and pre-
and post-conditions of these actions. We prove the
Katsuno-Mendelzon and the Darwiche-Pearl repre-
sentation theorems by restricting the logic to for-
mulas representing beliefs up to certain time. We
illustrate our belief change model through several
examples.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about the interplay between action and time is fun-
damental for the design and development of intelligent sys-
tems such as autonomous systems, robotic applications, and
service agents [Wooldridge, 2000; Doherty et al., 2009]. An-
alyzing the behavior of such systems, which are often spec-
ified in terms of actions’ pre- and post-conditions together
with some (behavioral/temporal) constraints, is not only in-
dispensable for checking system properties (e.g., safety and
liveness), there are also various applications that require auto-
matic reasoning about the interplay between actions and time.
For example, a calendar agent assisting its user in manag-
ing her calendar needs to reason about the actions/activities
scheduled in time to detect possible conflicts of activities.
On the one hand, reasoning about actions and time has
received an overwhelming attention in the last couple of
decades [Reiter, 2001; Kvarnstro¨m, 2005; Mueller, 2010;
Thielscher, 2001; Broersen, 2009], as well as in philoso-
phy [Nuel Belnap, 2001]. On the other hand, the theory of
belief revision has been investigated in detail [Peppas, 2007;
Ga¨rdenfors, 2003; Van Benthem, 2011]. However, few at-
tempts have been made to combine these two approaches, i.e.
revision of theories that are defined in terms of action specifi-
cations with behavioral and temporal constraints.
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Moreover, virtually all of the attempts to combine log-
ics for reasoning about action and time with belief revision
have been restricted purely to the syntactical level, mostly by
showing that revision in the proposed logic satisfies the AGM
postulates (e.g., [Shapiro et al., 2011; Jin and Thielscher,
2004; Scherl, 2005; Scherl and Levesque, 2003], but see Sec-
tion 6 for a more detailed discussion). Surprisingly, none
of these attempts prove the well-known representations the-
orems linking revision to a total pre-order on models.
The aim of this paper is to develop a logic about action and
time, such that this logic can be used within a more general
framework of belief revision. It is this constraint of using the
logic within a belief revision setting that drives the design of
the logic. Therefore, since belief revision is originally defined
for propositional logic, it is our methodology to stay as close
to propositional logic as possible.
We first develop the logic Parameterized-time Action
Logic (PAL). The language of this logic contains formulas
to reason about preconditions, postconditions, and the execu-
tion of actions. Atoms in the language are parameterized with
the state at which they are true. The main result of the paper
is that we prove the Katsuno-Mendelzon (KM) representation
theorem and the Darwiche-Pearl (DP) representation theorem
in PAL. To this end, we define a revision operator that revises
formulas up to a specific time point. We show that this leads
to models of system behaviors which can be finitely gener-
ated, i.e. be characterized by a single formula. We illustrate
our approach by examples and show how it can be applied
to various models of time, possibility and action. For exam-
ple, doing an action may imply its precondition, or it may be
equivalent to it.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is
preliminary and introduces belief revision concepts, in Sec-
tion 3 we introduce PAL, in Section 4 we study belief revi-
sion in PAL, in Section 5 we provide some examples, and in
Section 6 we discuss related work.
2 Preliminaries: Belief Revision
The AGM postulates [Alchourron et al., 1985] formulate
properties that should be satisfied by any (rational) revision
operators defined on deductively closed sets of propositional
formulas. Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) [1991] repre-
sent a belief set B as a propositional formula ψ such that
B = {ϕ | ψ ` ϕ}. They define the following six postulates for
revision on ψ and show that these are equivalent to the eight
AGM postulates:
(R1) ψ◦ϕ implies ϕ
(R2) If ψ∧ϕ is satisfiable, then ψ◦ϕ≡ ψ∧ϕ
(R3) If ϕ is satisfiable, then ψ◦ϕ is also satisfiable
(R4) If ψ≡ ψ′ and ϕ≡ ϕ′, then ψ◦ϕ≡ ψ′ ◦ϕ′
(R5) (ψ◦ϕ)∧ϕ′ implies ψ◦ (ϕ∧ϕ′)
(R6) If (ψ ◦ ϕ)∧ ϕ′ is satisfiable, then ψ ◦ (ϕ∧ ϕ′) implies
(ψ◦ϕ)∧ϕ′
Given a set I of all interpretations over some propositional
language, they define a faithful assignment as a function that
assigns each ψ to a pre-order ≤ψ on models satisfying the
following three conditions:
1. If I, I′ ∈Mod(ψ), then I <ψ I′ does not hold.
2. If I ∈Mod(ψ) and I′ 6∈Mod(ψ), then I <ψ I′ holds.
3. If ψ≡ φ, then ≤ψ=≤φ.
They show in a representation theorem that a revision oper-
ator ◦ satisfies postulates (R1)-(R6) iff there exists a faithful
assignment that maps each formula ψ to a total preorder ≤ψ
such that
Mod(ψ◦ϕ) = min(Mod(ϕ),≤ψ).
Darwiche and Pearl (DP) [1997] observe that the AGM
postulates are too permissive to enforce plausible iterated re-
vision. In order to remedy this, they suggest two changes to
the KM postulates (R1)-(R6):
• Instead of performing revision on a propositional for-
mula, perform revision on an abstract object called
an epistemic state Ψ, which contains, in addition to
the propositional beliefs Bel(Ψ), the entire information
needed for coherent reasoning. Formally, this means that
each ψ in (R1)-(R6) is replaced with Ψ, where Ψ means
Bel(Ψ) whenever it is embedded in a propositional for-
mula. So Ψ∧ϕ means Bel(Ψ)∧ϕ, and Ψ1 ≡Ψ2 means
Bel(Ψ1) ≡ Bel(Ψ2), while Ψ ◦ ϕ means an (abstract)
epistemic state.
• Postulate (R4) is weakened as follows:
(R*4) If Ψ=Ψ′ and ϕ≡ ϕ′, then Ψ◦ϕ≡Ψ′ ◦ϕ′
We refer to the DP postulates defined on epistemic states
as (R*1)-(R*6). DP propose the following four additional
postulates for a revision operator ◦ on epistemic states.
(C1) If ϕ |= ϕ′, then (Ψ◦ϕ′)◦ϕ≡Ψ◦ϕ.
(C2) If ϕ |= ¬ϕ′, then (Ψ◦ϕ′)◦ϕ≡Ψ◦ϕ
(C3) If Ψ◦ϕ |= ϕ′, then (Ψ◦ϕ′)◦ϕ |= ϕ′
(C4) If Ψ◦ϕ 6|= ¬ϕ′, then (Ψ◦ϕ′)◦ϕ 6|= ¬ϕ′
They alter the KM definition of a faithful assignment to
epistemic states and obtain a representation theorem similar
to that of KM above. They show in a second representation
theorem that a revision operator ◦t satisfying their postulates
(R*1)-(R*6) satisfies postulates (C1)-(C4) if and only if the
operator and its corresponding faithful assignment satisfy:
(CR1) If m1 |= ϕ and m2 |= ϕ, then m1 ≤Ψ m2 iff m1 ≤Ψ◦ϕ m2.
(CR2) If m1 6|= ϕ and m2 6|= ϕ, then m1 ≤Ψ m2 iff m1 ≤Ψ◦ϕ m2.
(CR3) If m1 |= ϕ, m2 6|= ϕ and m1 <Ψ m2, then m1 <Ψ◦ϕ m2.
(CR4) If m1 |= ϕ, m2 6|= ϕ and m1 ≤Ψ m2, then m1 ≤Ψ◦ϕ m2.
All the above results are based on propositional logic. Log-
ics for reasoning with beliefs about action specifications and
time are generally not propositional, but use modalities or
high-order logics (see Section 6 for a more detailed discus-
sion). When moving from propositional logic to such more
expressive logics, it is in general no longer possible to rep-
resent a belief set by a single formula ψ, because it can no
longer be guaranteed that the number of models for the logic
is finite. This may have different reasons: Time can be infi-
nite, actions can be non-deterministic, or modalities may lead
to infinite models. Consequently, the KM and DP represen-
tation theorem can no longer be obtained directly for such
logics. In the following section, we develop a simple tem-
poral logic and show in the section following it that we can
reproduce both the KM and the DP representation theorems
for a restricted fragment of this logic.
3 Parameterized-time Action Logic (PAL)
Our aim in this section is to develop a logical system that
represents an agent’s beliefs about the current moment and
future moment and actions that may be performed. Beliefs
are represented by the formal languageL .
Definition 1 (Language). Let Act= {a,b,c, . . .} be a finite set
of deterministic primitive actions, and Prop = {p,q,r, . . .}∪
{pre(a), post(a) | a ∈ Act} be a finite set of propositions.1
The sets Prop and Act are disjoint. The languageL is induc-
tively defined by the following BNF grammar:
ϕ ::= χt | do(a)t |tϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ
with χ ∈ Prop,a ∈ Act, and t ∈N0. We abbreviate ¬t¬ with
♦t , and define ⊥≡ p0∧¬p0 and > ≡ ¬ ⊥. Past(t) is the set
of all PAL formulas generated by boolean combinations of
pt ′ , pre(a)t ′ , post(a)t ′ , t ′ϕ, and do(a)t ′−1 where t ′ ≤ t and ϕ
is some PAL formula.
Intuitively, pt means that the atomic formula p is true at
time t, do(a)t means that action a is executed at time t. To
every action and every time we associate formulas pre(a)t
and post(a)t+1, which are understood as the preconditions
and postconditions of action a at time t. The modal operator
t is interpreted as necessity, indexed with a time point t. The
other boolean connectives are defined as usual.
The semantics of our logic is similar to CTL* [Reynolds,
2002], namely a tree structure containing nodes and edges
connecting the nodes.2 With each natural number i ∈ N0 we
associate a set of states Si such that all these sets are disjoint.
We then define the accessibility relation between states such
that it generates an infinite, single tree.
1Throughout this paper we denote atomic propositions with χ.
2A tree can equivalently be seen as an enfolded transition system,
thereby representing all the possible runs through it. We choose to
represent our semantics using trees because it simplifies the com-
pleteness proofs. See Reynolds [2002] for an overview of different
kinds of semantics and conceptual underpinnings.
Definition 2 (Tree). A tree is quadruple T = (S,R,v,act)
where S =
⋃
n∈N0 Sn is a set of states, such that each St
is the set of states at time t, Si ∩ S j = /0 for i 6= j; R ⊆⋃
n∈N0 Sn×Sn+1 is an accessibility relation that is serial, lin-
early ordered in the past and connected (so S0 is a single-
ton); v : S→ 2Prop is a valuation function from states to sets
of propositions; and act : R → Act is a function assigning
actions to elements of the accessibility relation, such that ac-
tions are deterministic, i.e. if act((s,s′)) = act((s,s′′)), then
s′ = s′′.
Definition 3 (Path). Given a tree T = (S,R,v,act), a path pi=
(s0,s1, . . .) in T is a sequence of states such that (st ,st+1)∈ R.
We write pit to refer to the t’th state of the path pi and we
thus write v(pit) and act((pit ,pit+1)) to refer respectively to
the propositions true and the next action on path pi at time t.
For readability, we abbreviate act((pit ,pit+1)) with act(pit).
Intuitively, v(pit) are the propositions true at time t on path
pi, and act(pit) is the next action a on the path. There is a
natural equivalence relation ∼t on paths.
Definition 4 (Path equivalence). Two paths pi and pi′ are
equivalent up to time t, denoted pi ∼t pi′, if and only if
they contain the same states up to and including time t, i.e.
pi∼t pi′ iff (∀t ′ ≤ t).(v(pit ′) = v(pi′t ′)) and (∀t ′ < t).(act(pit ′) =
act(pi′t ′)).
Formulas in PAL are evaluated on a path. Therefore, a
model for a formula is pair consisting of a tree and a path
in this tree. This, together with some additional constraints
related to the pre- and post-conditions of actions, is our defi-
nition of a model.
Definition 5 (Model). A model is a pair (T,pi) where T =
(S,R,v,act) is a tree and pi is a path in T such that the follow-
ing conditions hold:
1. If act(pit) = a, then post(a) ∈ v(pit+1),
2. If pre(a) ∈ v(pit), then there is some pi′ in T with pi∼t pi′
and act(pi′t) = a.
We denote models with m1,m2, . . . and sets of models with
M1,M2, . . .. We denote the set of all models with M.
Definition 6 (Truth definitions). Let m = (T,pi) be a model
with T = (S,R,v,act):
T,pi |= χt iff χ ∈ v(pit) with χ ∈ Prop
T,pi |= do(a)t iff act(pit) = a
T,pi |= ¬ϕ iff T,pi 6|= ϕ
T,pi |= ϕ∧ϕ′ iff T,pi |= ϕ and T,pi |= ϕ′
T,pi |=tϕ iff for all pi′ in T : if pi′ ∼t pi, then T,pi′ |= ϕ
The logical notions of satisfiability, validity and semantics
consequence are defined as usual.
Definition 7. The logic PAL consists of the following axiom
schemas and rules:
Propositional tautologies (PROP)
t(ϕ→ ϕ′)→ (tϕ→tϕ′) (K)
tϕ→ ϕ (T)
♦tϕ→t♦tϕ (5)
χt →tχt , where χ ∈ Prop (A1)
♦tχt → χt , where χ ∈ Prop (A2)
tϕ→t+1ϕ (A3)
do(a)t →t+1do(a)t (A4)
♦t+1do(a)t → do(a)t (A5)∨
a∈Act do(a)t (A6)
do(a)t →∧b6=a¬do(b)t (A7)
pre(a)t → ♦tdo(a)t (A8)
do(a)t → post(a)t+1 (A9)
♦t(do(a)t ∧α)→t(do(a)t → α) (A10)
where α ∈ Past(t+1)
From ϕ, infer tϕ (NEC)
From ϕ,ϕ→ ϕ′, infer ϕ′ (MP)
The relation ` is defined in the usual way with the restric-
tion that (NEC) can be applied to theorems only.
Theorem 1 (Completeness Theorem). The logic PAL is
sound and strongly complete, i.e. T ` ϕ iff T |= ϕ.
Proof Sketch. We prove the following formulation of com-
pleteness: each consistent set of formulas T has a model. We
use the fact that each consistent set can be extended to a max-
imally consistent set (mcs) Σ, i.e. Σ is consistent and each
proper superset of Σ is inconsistent. In the first step we ex-
tend T to a mcs T ∗. We define a tree MT ∗ = (S,R,v,a):
1. S =
⋃
t∈N St where St = {[T ∗]t | T ∗ ≡t T ∗}
2. sRs′ iff (∃T ∗, t ∈ N).(s = [T ∗]t ∧ s′ = [T ∗]t+1)
3. p ∈ v(s) iff (∃T ∗, t ∈ N).(s = [T ∗]t ∧ pt ∈ T ∗).
4. a = act((s,s′)) iff (∃T ∗).(s = [T ∗]t ∧ s′ = [T ∗]t+1 ∧
do(a)t ∈ T ∗).
where [T ∗]t = {T ∗ | T ∗ ≡t T ∗} s.t. ≡t is an equivalence re-
lation on mcs’s defined by T ∗1 ≡t T ∗2 iff T ∗1 ∩Past(t) = T ∗2 ∩
Past(t). If pi(T ∗) = (s0,s1, . . .), where st = [T ∗]t , then one can
show that (MT ∗ ,pi(T ∗)) is a model. Finally, we prove that for
each ϕ, (MT ∗ ,pi(T ∗) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ T ∗), using induction on the
depth of the proof. Consequently, MT ∗ ,pi(T ∗) |= T .
We shortly highlight the most important axiomatization
considerations. First, note that exactly one action is executed
in each time point (A6 and A7), and that actions are deter-
ministic (A10). Semantically, this means that from a state,
one can never reach two different successor states through the
same action. The fact that postconditions of actions always
hold on a path (A9), but that preconditions may not (A8), sug-
gests that preconditions, unlike postconditions, need not be
believed when an action is selected. We might therefore think
of our belief model as, in some sense, one of “optimistic” be-
liefs. Returning to the calendar agent, it may be well possible
that a calendar contains the entry to possibly attend IJCAI
in July 2015, i.e. ♦Jan2015do(attend IJCAI)Jul2015, while the
precondition is not satisfied yet, i.e. the paper is not accepted
yet. And even if it would turn out that the paper is accepted,
there may be no budget yet, or no flight booked. Therefore,
we allow actions to be believed while preconditions are not
satisfied (yet). We will return to these considerations in more
detail in Section 5.
4 Belief Revision in PAL
Time in PAL is infinite in the future, so it is generally not pos-
sible to represent a PAL belief set closed under consequence
by a single formula ψ, since this may potentially lead to an
infinite conjunction. Therefore, we cannot prove the KM and
DP representation theorems directly. In this section, we de-
fine a bounded revision function and we restrict the syntax
and semantics of PAL up to a specific time point. We then
prove two representation theorems.
Single-Step Revision We define a bounded revision func-
tion ∗t revising a set of PAL formulas B with another PAL
formula ϕ, denoted B∗t ϕ, where t is the maximal time point
occurring in both B and ϕ. In order to do so, we first define
the set of formulas Formt containing all PAL formulas with
time points no larger than t, and Belt containing all sets of
Formt formulas.
Definition 8 (AGM t-Bounded Revision Function). Suppose
some t ∈ N0. Let max t(ϕ) denote the maximal time point
occurring in ϕ. Let Formt = {ϕ ∈ L | max t(ϕ) ≤ t} and
Belt = {Cl(S) | S⊆ Formt}.
An AGM t-bounded revision function ∗t : Belt ×Formt →
Belt maps a deductively closed set from Belt and a formula
from Formt to deductively closed set from Belt , and satisfies
the AGM postulates [Alchourron et al., 1985].
We next define a bounded model as a pair consisting of a
tree and a path, in which all paths in the tree are cut off up to
a specific time point.
Definition 9 (t-Bounded Model). Suppose some model m =
(T,pi). A t-bounded path pi[t] is defined from a path pi in T
as pi[t] = (pi0, . . . ,pit). A t-bounded model m[t] = (T [t],pi[t])
is a pair where T [t] = {pi[t] | pi ∈ T}. M[t] is the set of all
t-bounded models. If the time point t is irrelevant or clear
from the context, we may abbreviate pi[t],T [t],m[t] and M[t]
with pi,T ,m, and M, respectively.
We will show in Lemma 4 below that it is possible to
represent each B ∈ Belt by a formula ψ ∈ Formt such that
Cl(B) =Cl(ψ). Using this lemma, we adapt the definition of
a KM faithful assignment.
Definition 10 (t-Bounded Faithful Assignment). A t-
bounded faithful assignment is a function that maps each be-
lief formula ψ ∈ Formt to a total preorder ≤tψ on all models
such that:
1. If m1,m2 ∈Mod(ψ), then m1 ≤tψ m2 and m2 ≤tψ m1
2. If m1 ∈Mod(ψ) and m2 6∈Mod(ψ), then m1 <tψ m2
3. If ψ≡ φ, then ≤tψ=≤tφ
4. If m1 = m2, then m1 ≤tψ m2 and m2 ≤tψ m1
Since we only consider beliefs up to some time t, we do
not want to distinguish between models that are the same up
to time t in the total pre-order ≤tψ. This is essentially what
condition (4) of the faithful assignment above ensures. The
first three conditions are the same as those by KM.
Theorem 2 (Representation Theorem). A t-bounded revision
operator ◦t satisfies postulates (R1)-(R6) iff there exists a t-
bounded faithful assignment that maps each belief set ψ to a
total preorder ≤tψ such that
Mod(ψ◦t ϕ) = min(Mod(ϕ),≤tψ).
We will use the remainder of this subsection to prove the
representation theorem above. We first show that the number
of t-bounded model is finite.
Lemma 1. For each t ∈ N0,M[t] is finite.
Proof. Suppose some t ∈ N0. Since actions are deterministic
and there are finitely many actions in our logic, each state
has a finite number of successor states. Moreover, since there
are finitely many propositions in our language, the number of
possible valuations of the states is finite as well. Therefore,
the number of models in M[t] is finite.
The following lemma obtains a correspondence between
semantic consequence of two models equivalent up to t. The
proof is by induction on the depth of the formula.
Lemma 2. For each ϕ ∈ Formt and models m1,m2 ∈M, if
m1[t] = m2[t], then m1 |= ϕ iff m2 |= ϕ.
Let Ext(m) be the set of all possible extensions of the
bounded model m to models, i.e. Ext(m) = {m′ ∈M |m′[t] =
m}. We next show that we can represent each Ext(m) by a
single formula.
Lemma 3. For all t ∈N0 and m∈M[t], there exists a formula
f orm(m) ∈ Formt such that Mod( f orm(m)) = Ext(m).
Proof. For t ∈ N0 and m = (T,pi) we define:
αpi =
t∧
n=0
 ∧
χ∈v(pin)
χn∧
∧
χ6∈v(pin)
¬χn∧
∧
act(pin)=a
do(a)n∧
∧
act(pin)6=a
¬do(a)n)
 .
Then we define:
f orm(m) = αpi∧
∧
pi′∈T
♦0αpi′ ∧
∧
pi′ 6∈T
¬♦0αpi′ .
It follows directly from our construction that m is a model
of f orm(m). By Lemma 2 for each m′ ∈ Ext(m) : m′ |=
f orm(m). What remains to show is that if m′ = (T ′,pi′)
and m 6= m′, then m′ 6|= f orm(m). Since m′ 6= m we have
(1) T 6= T ′ or (2) pi 6= pi′. In case (1), if there exists some
path pi′′ ∈ T s.t. pi′′ 6∈ T ′, then the formula ♦0αpi′′ is true
in m but not in m′. But then f orm(m) is also not true in
m′, hence m′ 6|= f orm(m). If there exists some path pi′′ ∈ T ′
and pi′′ 6∈ T , then ¬♦0αpi′′ is true in m but not in m′, so
m′ 6|= f orm(m) follows as well. In case (2) αpi 6= αpi′ and
thus m′ 6|= f orm(m).
We can now show that it is indeed possible to represent a
belief base in Belt as a single formula.
Lemma 4. For each B ∈ Belt there exists a formula ψ such
that B =Cl(ψ).
Proof. Suppose an arbitrary B ∈ Belt . It follows from
Lemma 1 that the number of t-bounded models for B is finite.
Therefore, using Lemma 3 we define ψ =
∨
m[t]|=B f orm(m).
So, the set of t-bounded models of ψ is the union of the set
of t-bounded models of B. Therefore, m[t] |= B iff m[t] |= ψ.
By Lemma 2, m |= B iff m |= ψ, so B |= ϕ iff ψ |= ϕ. Fi-
nally, by the completeness theorem we can conclude B ` ϕ iff
ψ ` ϕ.
We next provide a proof sketch of Theorem 2.
Proof Sketch (Theorem 2). (⇒): We define a t-bounded
faithful assignment ≤tψ as: m1 ≤tψ m2 iff m1 ∈ Mod(ψ)
or m1 ∈ Mod(ψ ◦t f orm(m) ∨ f orm(m′)). Let us prove
the new condition (4) of Def. 10. Let m and m′ be such
that m = m′. By Lemm 3, Mod( f orm(m)) = Ext(m) =
Ext(m′) = Mod( f orm(m′)). Hence, f orm(m) ≡ f orm(m′),
so f orm(m,m′)≡ f orm(m). By (R4): Mod(ψ◦t f orm(m)) =
Mod(ψ ◦t f orm(m,m′))). By (R1), m ∈Mod(ψ ◦t f orm(m),
so m ∈ Mod(ψ ◦t f orm(m,m′)). Hence, by the definition of
≤tψ: m≤tψ m′. We can prove m′ ≤tψ m similarly.
(⇐): We show that there exists some ψ ◦t ϕ ⊆ Formt s.t.
Mod(ψ◦t ϕ) = min(Mod(ϕ),≤tψ). Suppose that ϕ is consis-
tent (ϕ ≡⊥ is trivial). If m ∈ min(Mod(ϕ),≤tψ), by condi-
tion (4) we obtain Ext(ϕ) ⊆ min(Mod(α),≤tψ). Thus, there
exists a set S ⊆M[t] s.t. min(Mod(ϕ),≤tψ) = ∪m∈SExt(m).
If ψ ◦t ϕ is the formula ∨m∈S f orm(m), then Mod(ψ ◦t ϕ) =∪m∈SExt(m) by Lemma 3. So there exists such ψ◦t ϕ. For the
other parts of the proof we modify KM straightforwardly.
Iterated Revision Recall from Section 2 that Darwiche
and Pearl propose to revise epistemic states instead of be-
lief bases. When switching from belief revision on a belief
state to belief revision on an epistemic state the definition of
a faithful assignment should be adopted accordingly. We will
do this now for our setting. Recall that Ψ stands for Bel(Ψ)
whenever it is embedded in a propositional formula.
Definition 11 (t-bounded faithful assignment on epistemic
states). A t-bounded faithful assignment on epistemic states
maps each epistemic state Ψ with Bel(Ψ) from Belt , to a total
pre-order ≤tΨ on all models such that:
1. If m1,m2 |=Ψ, then m1 ≤tΨ m2 and m2 ≤tΨ m1
2. If m1 |=Ψ and m1 6|=Ψ, then m1 <tΨ m2
3. If Ψ=Φ, then ≤Ψ=≤Φ
4. If m1 = m2, then m1 ≤tΨ m2 and m2 ≤tΨ m1
The next representation theorem is similar to Theorem 2,
but it uses the DP postulates on epistemic states and the t-
bounded faithful assignment on epistemic states that we de-
fined above. Recall that we refer to the DP postulates as
(R*1)-(R*6).
Theorem 3 (Representation Theorem). A t-bounded revision
operator ◦t satisfies postulates (R*1)-(R*6) precisely when
there exists a t-bounded faithful assignment on epistemic
states that maps each epistemic state Ψ to a total pre-order
≤tΨ such that
Mod(Ψ◦t ϕ) = min(Mod(ϕ),≤tΨ)
Proof Sketch. Straightforward modification of the proof of
Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Suppose that a t-bounded revision operator on
epistemic states satisfies postulates (R*1)-(R*6). The opera-
tor satisfies postulates (C1)-(C4) iff the operator and its cor-
responding faithful assignment satisfy:
CR1 If m1 |= ϕ and m2 |= ϕ, then m1 ≤tΨ m2 iff m1 ≤tΨ◦ϕ m2.
CR2 If m1 6|= ϕ and m2 6|= ϕ, then m1 ≤tΨ m2 iff m1 ≤tΨ◦ϕ m2.
CR3 If m1 |= ϕ, m2 6|= ϕ and m1 <tΨ m2, then m1 <tΨ◦ϕ m2.
CR4 If m1 |= ϕ, m2 6|= ϕ and m1 ≤tΨ m2, then m1 ≤tΨ◦ϕ m2.
Proof Sketch. (⇐): Identical to DP.
(⇒): We prove (C1)⇒ (CR1), the proofs for the other postu-
lates are similar. Suppose that (C1) holds and m,m′ |= ϕ. Let
α= f orm(m,m′). By Lemma Lemma 3, Mod(α) =Ext(m)∪
Ext(m′). If m′′ ∈ Ext(m), then m = m′′, so by Lemma
Lemma 2 we obtain m′′ |= ϕ. Similarly, if m′′ ∈ Ext(m′),
then m′′ |= ϕ, so α |= ϕ. By (C1), (Ψ ◦t ϕ) ◦t α ≡ Ψ ◦t α.
In other words, min(Mod(α),≤tΨ◦tϕ) = min(Mod(α),≤tΨ).
Consequently, m≤tΨ◦tϕ m′ iff m≤tΨ m′.
5 Examples
We start with a simple example illustrating revision using a
pre-order over models in our temporal logic.
Example 1. Suppose a setting with two actions, i.e.
Act = {a,b} and no propositions other than the pre-
and postconditions for these actions, i.e. Prop =
{pre(a), post(a), pre(b), post(b)}. Suppose that ψ is equiva-
lent to
do(a)0∧ pre(a)0∧¬pre(b)0∧¬post(a)0∧¬post(b)0∧
¬♦0 pre(a)1∧¬♦0 pre(b)1∧¬post(b)1.
The three 1-bounded models of ψ are {m1,m2,m3}. See Fig-
ure 1, note that formulas that are false in a state have been
omitted. If we define ≤tψ as m1 ≤tψ m2 iff m1 ∈ Mod(ψ)
or m1 ∈Mod(ψ◦t ( f orm(m1)∨ f orm(m2)), then these three
models are minimal. Suppose we for instance revise with
¬♦0 post(b)1. Then, bounded models m2 and m3 are removed,
i.e. Mod[1](ψ ◦1 ¬♦0 post(b)1) = {m1}, while revising with
♦0do(b)0 will remove model m1, since in this model it is not
possible that action b is executed.
pre(a)
post(a)
pre(a)
post(a)
post(b)
pre(a)
post(a)
post(b),
post(a)
m1 m2 m3
a a
b
a
b
Figure 1: Example 1-bounded models, where bold lines indicate ac-
tual paths.
Our next example considers the relation between precondi-
tions and actions in the axiomatization of PAL.
Example 2. The calendar agent believes that IJCAI is at-
tended in July 2015 because a paper has been submitted.
Now, the agent learns in March that the paper to IJCAI is
rejected, which causes the agent to believe that it will be im-
possible to attend IJCAI. However, the agent upholds its be-
lief that IJCAI is attended in July. Let t1 and t2 as before.
Ψ≡ do(a)t2
Ψ◦t2 t1¬pre(a)t2 ≡ do(a)t2 ∧¬pre(a)t2
As we already briefly mentioned in Section 3, in our
current model preconditions are sufficient conditions of
actions to be possible, but they are not necessary. Such a
model can be used in planning domains in which it, at the
moment of planning, may not be clear whether preconditions
are true [Shoham, 2009]. While such optimistic beliefs
allow an agent to reason about its actions while not being
committed to accept the preconditions of these action, this
assumption may in some cases be considered rather weak.
We can straightforwardly strengthen this assumption by
replacing axiom (A8) with the following:
pre(a)t ↔ ♦tdo(a)t (A8’)
Completeness is preserved by changing the condition (2)
of Definition 5 from an “if” to an “if and only if”. Indeed,
it can be verified that in the previous example adopting the
belief that the precondition to attend IJCAI is impossible will
cause the agent to drop its belief that it will attend IJCAI.
6 Related Work
Many logical systems have been developed for reasoning
about the pre and postconditions of actions with explicit time
points, such as the Event Calculus [Mueller, 2010], Temporal
Action Logics [Kvarnstro¨m, 2005], extensions to the Fluent
Calculus [Thielscher, 2001], and extensions to the Situation
Calculus [Papadakis and Plexousakis, 2003] (see [Patkos,
2010, Ch.2] for an overview). Much effort in this field con-
centrates on extending these action theories to incorporate
sensing or knowledge-producing actions, i.e., actions whose
effects change the mental state of an agent instead of the
world. Shapiro [2011] extends the Situation Calculus to
reason about beliefs rather than knowledge by introducing
a modality B and shows that both the AGM postulates and
the DP postulates are satisfied in this framework. A similar
approach concerning the Fluent Calculus has been formal-
ized by Jin and Thielscher [2004], and is further developed
by Scherl [2005] and Scherl and Levesque [2003] by taking
into account the frame problem as well. Although these ap-
proaches all obtain correspondences with the AGM or DP
postulates on a syntactical level, none of them prove repre-
sentations theorems linking revision to a total pre-order on
models.
Baral and Zhang [2005] model belief updates on the ba-
sis of semantics of modal logic S5 by specifying an update
according to the minimal change on both the agent’s actual
world and knowledge. They show that their knowledge up-
date operator satisfies all the KM postulates. Bonanno [2007]
combines temporal logic with AGM belief revision as well,
and extends a temporal logic with a belief operator and an
information operator. Both these approaches do not take ac-
tion or time into account and do not provide a representation
theorem.
Semantically, PAL is close to CTL* [Reynolds, 2002], dat-
ing back to Prior [1967] with three important differences.
First, PAL contains time-indexed modalities, which allows
one to express statements such as “It is possible in February
that I will attend IJCAI in July”. Secondly, PAL allows for ex-
plicit reasoning about pre-and postconditions of deterministic
actions (axiom A10). Thirdly, PAL only contains one type of
modality, while CTL* contains a next operator and an until
operator as well. The last two reasons arguably make PAL
less expressive that CTL*, but in return the axiomatization is
straightforward, we are able to obtain strong completeness,
and it is possible to prove both representation theorems. It
seems that this is not possible for CTL* in general.
The logic PAL is also closely related to the logic developed
by Icard et al. [2010], who study the joint revision of be-
liefs and intentions using AGM-like postulates. However, we
show in a recent paper that one of their axioms is not sound
and that their logic is noncompact, so no axiomatization using
their syntax and semantics (including theirs) is strongly com-
plete [van Zee et al., 2015]. Moreover, we focus on revision
of beliefs up to time t and iterated revision.
7 Summary and Outlook
We present a temporal logic for reasoning about beliefs
and action in time. To apply the Katsuno-Mendelzon and
Darwiche-Pearl representation theorems to belief sets of this
logic, we restrict ourselves to beliefs generated by formulas
which represent beliefs up to certain time. Using this restric-
tion, we prove both representation theorems for our logic.
The main challenge of this paper is to define revision in a
temporal logic with infinite time. While much research has
focused on extending existing logics for reasoning about ac-
tion and change with the incorporation of new beliefs, the se-
mantic counterpart in the form of a total pre-order on models
is not taken into account. This paper has tried to take a first
step into this direction, but there are many directions from
here that should be explored:
The frame problem is one of the most fundamental prob-
lems in reasoning about action and change. The challenge is
how to specify the non-effects of actions succinctly. For in-
stance, if a proposition such as “The table is red” is true at
some time t, and no action occurs that affects the truth value
of this proposition, then it seems plausible that the table is still
red at time t + 1. Currently, our framework does not contain
so-called “frame axioms”, and it is an interesting question
how the AGM and DP postulates can be extended to account
for such behavior as well.
Other mental attitudes, such as intentions, goals, desires
and preferences, we have left out completely. This is not be-
cause we assume that they are unimportant, but because it
was our goal to focus on belief revision in a temporal set-
ting. However, returning to our calender assistant, there is
nothing keeping us from treating the appointments that a user
makes as “intentions”, and given the recent work in the revi-
sion of intentions [Shoham, 2009; van der Hoek et al., 2007;
Icard et al., 2010; Lorini et al., 2009] this certainly is a direc-
tion worth exploring.
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